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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the possibility of relaxing the privity principle of contract to 
accommodate the interests of third parties in South Africa. It explores concepts relating to the 
doctrine of privity as well as the two legs that constitute this common law doctrine. It will draw 
lessons from the English legal system because English law of contract managed to reform the 
doctrine of privity in order to accommodate the interests of third parties to a contract. While 
this thesis is not a comparative study of England and South Africa, it will draw substantially 
from lessons that can be taken from England with regard to abrogating the privity principle of 
contract. England has been chosen as the point of reference because there has not yet been any 
other African country that has reformed this privity principle of the common law of contract in 
order to accommodate the interests of third parties.  
 
Various theories will be employed to try and establish how the doctrine came to be. It has to 
be noted that this thesis does not allow for a comprehensive discussion of the theories that 
explain the doctrine of privity and therefore the discussion will only be limited to issues directly 
relating to the formulation of the doctrine. The thesis will also bring to the fore the general 
reasons why the doctrine is regarded as essential in the law of contract. 
 
This thesis advocates for the relaxation of the privity doctrine ranging from social contracts to 
commercial contracts in order to identify the appropriate elements of minimising the negative 
effects that it has on third parties. It investigates the promulgation of the doctrine in the early 
periods of the common law as well as to how the doctrine found its roots in South Africa. The 
doctrine of privity in the English law has undergone a legislative summersault as it has been 
highlighted to cause considerable injustice to third parties.1 This reformation was spearheaded 
by the English law reform commission who noted the dire need to dilute the common law 
doctrine of privity of contract. The same approach is also going to be taken in this thesis as it 
is going to traverse the development and the operation of this doctrine in South Africa and how 
it causes so much detriment to third parties.2 The thesis also suggests solutions to the problems 
                                                          
1 Law Reform Commission Report on Privity of Contract and Third Party Right (2008) 1. 
2 See chapter 3.2. 
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incurred by third parties as a result of the privity doctrine as well as solutions to address the 
problems.  
 
To fully understand the privity doctrine, regard has to be had to the English legal system 
because the doctrine of privity emanated from there.3 It was then subsumed into the South 
African legal system4 with colonisation and has been part of our legal system up to date. Unlike 
in the English legal system however, the doctrine of privity of contract has not been reformed 
in South Africa. It still remains part of our legal system. As the thesis illustrates in chapter 
three, sometimes the doctrine causes hardships to third parties in a contract. It is for this reason 
that it must be reformed in order to avoid undue hardships which are sometimes faced by third 
parties to a contract.  
 
As already mentioned, the doctrine of privity of contract is a long - established principle of the 
law of contract which was introduced to South African law during the British colonisation of 
South Africa.5  Its essence is that only parties who actually negotiated a contract are privy to it 
and can enforce its terms.6 While the concept will be explained in detail later on in chapters 
two and three, for now it suffices to state that privity of a contract entails that no one may be 
entitled to or bound by the terms of a contract to which he is not an original party.7 This was a 
decision reached upon by the common law judges in the ground breaking case of Tweddle v 
Atkinson.8 This common law principle for the law of contract, however, was not settled during 
this period.  It was not universally accepted as true in the earlier common law.9 This was mainly 
because the actions of debt and account10 had been available to third parties who wished to 
                                                          
3 Cheshire and Fafoot Law of Contract 7th ed (1969) 402. 
4 Together with Roman Dutch Law. The end result is legal pluralism in South Africa. 
5 Woods D Biko – Cry Freedom (1991) 30.  
6 Christie R The Law of Contract in South Africa 4th ed (2001).  
7 Price v Easton (1833) 4 B AD 433.); Tweddle v Atkinson (1861 EWHC J57 (QB); Grant v Stonestreet 1968 (4) 
SA 1 (A);  Jansen v Piennar (1881) 1 SC 276; Cullinan v Noordkaaplandse Aartappelkenrmoerkwekers 
Kooperasie Bpk (1972) 1 SA 761; Barclays National Bank Ltd v H J de Vos Boerdery Ondernemings (Edms) Bpk 
(1980) 4 SA 475 (A); Minister of Public works and Land Affairs v Group five Building Ltd (1999) 4 SA 12 (SCA). 
8 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861 EWHC J57 (QB). 
9 Cheshire and Fafoot Law of Contract 7th ed (1969) 402. 
10 Action of debt and account   extended the right that lawsuits could be brought against persons who were 
required to act primarily for someone else’s benefit, such as guardians and partners.  
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reap the benefit of an arrangement made by others on their behalf.11 There were also attempts 
to circumvent this doctrine by the early common law decisions as they allowed a party to sue 
upon a promise, provided that there was some tie of natural affliction and a family relationship 
between the third party beneficiary and one of the contracting parties.12 
 
It was only in the middle of the 19th century that judges reaffirmed the idea of bargain as the 
foundation of English Contract, and they unnaturally drew the inference that only the parties 
to the bargain, themselves incurring reciprocal obligations should enjoy reciprocal rights.13 The 
doctrine of privity crystallised in 1861 as such bargain cases were denounced.14 As mentioned 
above, the decisive case was Tweddle v Atkinson where an intended marriage between the 
plaintiff and the daughter of William Guy was concluded.15 A contract was made between Guy 
and the Plaintiff’s father, whereby each of the contractants promised to pay the plaintiff a sum 
of money.16 Guy failed to do so, and the plaintiff sued his executors.17 The action was dismissed 
and the authority of Dutton v Poole was rejected as it encapsulated that a stranger could sue for 
a benefit provided that parties entered into a contract for such purposes.18  The court held that, 
“on the contrary, it is now established that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage 
of a contract even though it was made for his benefit.”19 This gave rise to the seclusion of third 
parties from suing for their benefit. A contract was thus regarded to be an intimate, if not the 
exclusive, relationship between the parties who had made it.20 This gave rise to the doctrine of 
privity which seeks to exclude a person who is not a party to a contract from acquiring rights 
under it or from imposing duties on a person who is not a party to a contract. 
 
                                                          
11 Hugh Collins The law of contract (1989) 305.  
12 Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev 211. 
13 Cheshire and Fafoot Law of Contract 7th ed (1969) 402. 
14 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
15 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
16 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
17 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
18 Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev 211. 
19 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
20 Price v Easton (1833) 4 B AD 433, Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
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As highlighted above, South African law of contract takes from the British law of contract. The 
common law of contract was influenced by the arrival of the British in 1820.21 British common 
law together with the privity doctrine was thus imposed on South Africa.22 In its preamble, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognises “injustices of the past” such as the 
imposition of unjust laws.  The privity doctrine in its current form will be highlighted to be an 
example of an unjust form of law which was inherited from the past. It is unjust in so far as it 
does not accommodate the interests of third parties in instances when the latter have genuine 
interests in a contract. It therefore needs to be reformed to accommodate the interests of third 
parties as is the case in English law. In as much as the law of contract made it easy for 
commerce in South Africa, most of these contracts were to the detriment of the local 
populace.23 Thus, the doctrine of privity, while not an irrational inference from the nature of 
contract in general and of English contract in particular, has in its incidence worked injustice 
and proved inadequate to the needs of  contemporary South Africa.24 There is a duty bestowed 
on the courts by the Constitution to develop the common law to promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.25  It is upon this basis that this thesis suggests a revision of the 
privity doctrine of contract. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The aim of this study is to investigate how the privity doctrine can be relaxed to accommodate 
the interest of third parties in South Africa. The study also aims to:  
i. Discuss the disadvantages of the privity doctrine on third parties; 
ii. Illustrate that it is possible to relax the privity doctrine to accommodate the interests of 
third parties; 
iii. Examine the importance and benefits of relaxing the privity doctrine in South Africa; 
                                                          
21 Woods D Biko – Cry Freedom (1991) 30. 
22 Woods D Biko – Cry Freedom (1991) 30. 
23 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed   (2017) 703. 
24 The doctrine violates a fundamental right which is enshrined in the Constitution of access to courts. The 
constitution allows anyone with a dispute to approach the Courts and the privity doctrine frustrates this 
fundamental right by excluding interested third parties. The doctrine hence goes against the prescripts of the law 
of the land and thus needs to be reformed. 
25 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 39 (2). 
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iv. Explore international best practices in the reformation of the privity doctrine that South 
Africa could emulate; and also to,  
v. Recommend how the privity doctrine can be relaxed in South Africa to accommodate 
the interests of third parties. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As highlighted earlier, the privity principle sometimes results in harsh and unintended 
consequences on third parties to a contract. This research in part seeks to address these harsh 
consequences incurred by third parties by the privity rule in South Africa. It also seeks to 
suggest how the privity principle can be relaxed in order to prevent third parties from 
experiencing unintended negative consequences. There is also a vitiation of inalienable rights 
as enshrined in the Bill of rights to particular individuals if the rule is not reformed. Ultimately, 
the research will address whether the common law rule of contract can be relaxed to 
accommodate the interest of third parties. This thesis will also make references contracts 
ranging from the exceptions created to the privity rule such as stipulatio alteri, cession, pre 
incorporation contracts, companies contracts and investments on behalf of its employees, and 
separate legal entity of companies just to mention but a few. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION  
In light of the research objectives as well as the problem statement outlined above, the main 
question that this thesis seeks to answer is whether or not the Common Law principle of privity 
of contract can be relaxed to accommodate the interests of third parties in South Africa. 
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hutchison argues that the privity rule can be relaxed with regard to the creation of rights for 
third parties since there is nothing inherently objectionable about two persons agreeing to 
confer a benefit.26 He however omits to indicate the need to completely reform the rule to 
include not only when a benefit is conferred but where a third party has an interest in the matter. 
Other countries such as Ireland have however formalised the reformation of the privity rule to 
allow a third party to sue for their benefit.27 The Law Reform Commission of Ireland 
provisionally recommends that the rule of privity should be reformed to allow third parties to 
                                                          
26 Hutchison et al The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2018) 35-36. 
27 Lilienthal J ‘Privity of Contract’ (1887) Harvard Law Review Vol. 1, No.5 226 -232. 
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enforce rights under contracts not only made for their benefit, but for those as well who stand 
to gain from the contract without necessarily being beneficiaries or parties to the contract.28 In 
South Africa, such reformation to the doctrine has not yet occurred. As such, there is a need to 
also fill the gap that has been created by this old age common law doctrine in South Africa.  
 
Academics such as Kotz are of the view that even though the privity of contract still stands, a 
very considerable number of exceptions have gradually nibbled away at the principle itself.29 
Indeed, there are a few circumstances of practical importance today where the principle is liable 
to be applicable and to work without posing a serious injustice or inconvenience.30 This 
argument acknowledges the dynamic nature that the law has. The principle might not be 
causing gross injustice in other jurisdictions but it certainly is doing so in South Africa as the 
thesis will illustrate in chapter three. A good example of such injustice is noted in the case of 
Member of Executive Council v Terra Graphics which will be discussed later in chapter three. 
This case involved a local government authority who relied on the privity doctrine to escape 
contractual liability despite guaranteeing payment upon completion of a job to a sub-
contractor.31 This case illustrates the injustices that are usually perpetuated in cases of 
construction contracts to third parties. The doctrine should thus be reformed in order to protect, 
strengthen and enhance the rights of third party beneficiaries with particular attention to 
construction contracts. This thesis will therefore illustrate the inconveniences and injustices 
that will continue to exist if this doctrine is rigidly applied in South African contract law. 
 
Lilienthal J argues that the doctrine has exploded and that the jurisprudence has advanced to 
such a stage where the law operating on the act of the parties created the duty, established the 
privity, implied an obligation upon which the action was relied upon.32 This is an indication 
that, in some jurisdictions such as Ireland, Britain and the United States of America, efforts are 
already underway to try and curtail the harsh and unintended consequences that the privity 
doctrine has on third parties. There is a need to learn and inculcate the reformulation and the 
                                                          
28 Law Reform Commission Report on Privity of Contract and Third Party Right (2008) 1. 
29 P S Atiyah, The Law of Contract 3rd ed (1981) 261. 
30 Kotz H ‘The doctrine of privity of contract in the context of contracts protecting the interests of third parties’ 
(1990) Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 10, 195. 
31 Member of Executive Council v Terra Graphics (2015) (4) ZASCA 116. 
32 Lilienthal J ‘Privity of Contract’ (1887) Harvard Law Review Vol. 1, No.5 226 -232. 
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relaxation of this principle in certain circumstances as in some jurisdictions the same 
developments are taking influence as will be highlighted below.33 
While some argue that there is a theoretical basis for the exclusion of third party rights, Ronan 
MacSweeney maintains that a strict adherence of the privity doctrine can cause considerable 
inconvenience and apparent injustice on third parties.34 This illustrates the position that South 
Africa is susceptible to if the doctrine is not abrogated to a significant extent. As will be 
discussed later in chapter two, a rigid adherence to the doctrine has an effect of causing 
significant inconvenience and injustices to the people who find themselves as interested third 
parties in contracts. This point is succinctly illustrated in the case of Member of the Executive 
Council v Terra Graphics which involves a provincial government behaving unconscionably 
as it relied on the doctrine of privity to escape liability from a subcontractor.35  The court in 
this case had an opportunity to develop the common law of the law of contract in as far as the 
privity of contract is concerned but nevertheless, it did not. 
 
The doctrine has also been described as notoriously inconvenient by John Adams who argues 
that one important cautionary note should be inserted in the whole paradigm and rationale of 
the privity doctrine.36 Adams suggests that there is need for an adoption of a concept known as 
reasonable foresight as to the range of contractual liability.37 The concept entails that the law 
simply extends the range of liability beyond the parties to the contract to those who are 
sufficiently proximate, without affecting the available defences to such a cause of action.38 This 
was the outcome in the British case of Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities where the court 
held that it was high time for the concept of foreseeability39 to be imported to dilute the harsh 
                                                          
33 Reformation has been effected in common law countries of Ireland and England. This reformation has been 
advocated for by the law reform commissions of these respective jurisdictions as there was an indication in its 
application that it was causing immense injustices.  
34 Ronan MacSweeney ‘Privity of contract and third party rights: an unnecessary anomaly and complex in need 
of reform’ (2016) Heinonline, 157. 
35 Member of Executive Council v Terra Graphics (2015) (4) ZASCA 116. 
36 John N. A ‘Privity and the Concept of a Network Contract’ (1990)  Legal Stud. 12.145. 
37 Hugh Collins The law of contract (1986) 112. 
38 John N. A ‘Privity and the Concept of a Network Contract’ (1990)  Legal Stud. 12.145. 
39 Foreseeability concept entails the ability to be apprehensive o the fact that the privity doctrine might result in 
an injury to a third party who might find an interest in a contract that he/she is not a party to. 
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and unintended injustices that can be caused by applying the doctrine of privity rigidly.40 The 
South African law of contract regulating the privity rule should also conform to this test as 
suggested by John Adams. This is an indication that the law is developing in other jurisdictions 
and this should be emulated by the South African judicial system.  
 
Roman law seems to also have profound effect on South Africa’s Law of Contract as the Roman 
Dutch Law writer Voet remarked that,  
“If the mandatory has in turn entrusted the business entrusted to himself to some other person, no action 
is available to the first mandator against the second mandatory, but the first mandator ought to sue the 
first mandatary, and the latter in turn to sue the second mandatary”41  
This is indicative of the Roman law entrenching the doctrine of privity. This was held in the 
Watson v Sachs42 case which is going to be discussed in more detail later in chapter three. The 
series of legal processions that were mentioned by Voet seem to preclude the nature and setting 
of the South African environment. South Africa is constituted by a majority of previously 
disadvantaged and vulnerable members of society. Most of these individuals live in squalid 
circumstances and they do not afford legal fees required to mount legal battles.43    
 
In Watson v Sachs, Van Heerden JA quoting Devilliers CJ disagreeing with Voet remarked that 
“I still consider, as I then did, that this principle enunciated by Voet was not intended to apply to cases 
where in the ordinary course of business it becomes necessary for the agent to employ a subagent. If the 
custom is established and well known, it would be no violation of that principle to hold that a privity is 
thus created between the principal and the subagent.”44 
 
This obiter signalled the dawn of a new era as far as the issue of the development of the common 
law was concerned in relation to the doctrine of privity. This laid a fertile and solid foundation 
for the reformulation of the doctrine of privity in the South African contractual prism. The 
opportunity was however missed as the Court enunciated that it was only going to be a once 
off decision where privity would be established between a principle and a sub agent. It was on 
                                                          
40 Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities (1985) 3 WLR 993. 
41 Watson v Sachs and Another (1994) ZASCA 419 (A). 
42 Watson v Sachs and Another (1994) ZASCA 419 (A). 
43 Watson v Sachs and Another (1994) ZASCA 419 (A). 
44 Watson v Sachs and Another (1994) ZASCA 419 (A). 
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this case that signals of change should have been effected to outlaw the common law principle 
of privity. 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY  
The study will add to the existing jurisprudence on the reformation of the common law doctrine 
of privity of contract and will be of interest not only in South Africa but to other jurisdictions 
in Africa particularly because of the increase of contracts being concluded which involve third 
parties on a day to day basis.  As already discussed, while this is not a comparative study, this 
thesis will also significantly refer to England as the latter has made some considerable strides 
towards reforming this common law doctrine of privity of contract. The United States of 
America has actually woken up to the realisation that a body of judges in the New York Court 
of Appeals had, in words at least, distinctly made this legal somersault, and had apparently 
succeeded in legislating the old principle out of existence.45 In the United States, they accepted 
that the doctrine imposes limitations that are not justifiable and reasonable in an open and 
democratic society. 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
The research will analyse primary sources of law such as relevant international conventions 
and protocols, the Constitution of South Arica, relevant legislation and case law. Secondary 
sources such as textbooks, journal articles and newspaper articles that deal with rights of third 
parties in South Africa are also going to be taken into consideration. It has to be highlighted 
however that the research shall limit the use of secondary sources as this is a fairly new topic 
where not much has been written.  Internet based publications, reports and other desktop 
materials will be utilised for this study. 
1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter one is an introduction to the thesis; it will give the background to the study, the problem 
statement, aims of the study, literature review and the significance of the study.  
Chapter two will be an analysis of the privity of contract doctrine generally as well as the 
development of the doctrine. 
                                                          
45 Lilienthal J ‘Privity of Contract’ (1887) Harvard Law Review Vol. 1, No.5 226 -232. 
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Chapter three will focus on the conceptual framework regulating the privity doctrine in South 
Africa. 
Chapter four will be an analogy to Britain pertaining to the reformation of the common law 
doctrine of privity of contract. 
Chapter five will be a conclusion of the topic and recommendations for South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter introduced the thesis by focusing on the background to the study, the problem 
statement, aims of the study, literature review and the significance of the study.  The chapter 
also gave an overview of what will be contained in the research. A brief introduction to the 
concept of privity was also hinged upon and the doctrine will be explained further in this 
chapter. This chapter will discuss what the privity principle entails and how it was formulated 
in the English system as well as to how the doctrine eventually found its roots in South Africa. 
Much focus is going to be placed on how the doctrine was formulated in the English legal 
system. This will assist in following and understanding the injustices that are associated with 
the doctrine as will be highlighted in this chapter. The background to the doctrine of privity is 
also going to be demonstrated by using the leading cases.  The chapter will also discuss various 
theories which are utilised to explain the doctrine of privity and this is not going to be done 
comprehensively because the theories have been expounded on by other authors elsewhere.46 
The thesis will only deal with the aspects that help in assisting the genesis of the principle of 
privity of contract. 
2.2 THE PRIVITY PRINCIPLE OF CONTRACT 
The principle of privity is one of the noted and respected cornerstones for the law of contract.47 
A contract, being a private transaction, generally creates personal rights and duties only for the 
parties to the contract and not anyone else.48 Christie has cited that a contract creates rights and 
duties exclusively for the parties to that contract and does not include random third parties.49 
The rationale behind this principle is to avoid the imposition of duties on third parties as it 
would be manifestly unreasonable and unfair if two parties, by their own private act burden a 
third party to incur obligations that he/she is not cognisant of.50 The doctrine therefore 
reinforces the idea that only parties to a contract are legally entitled to enforce it, or be bound 
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47 Hutchison et al The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2018) 223. 
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by it.51 This is cognisant of the fact that, while performance of a contract may in some 
circumstances result in a benefit, it can also result in a burden for a third party to a contract. As 
a matter of law, a third party cannot enforce the contract or be subject to liabilities imposed by 
the contract.52 Treitel defines the concept of privity as that general rule that a contract should 
be between two parties to confer rights or impose obligations arising under it and not on any 
person except the parties to it.53 The Law Commission of England reiterates the same position 
as privity is treated with regards to the theory of consideration that is a contract cannot confer 
rights to impose obligations arising under it on any person except the parties to it.54 
Furthermore, in terms of privity of contract, the rights and obligations of parties are strictly the 
private matters of contracting parties and because of this; a stranger has no legal access to 
them.55 In simple terms, it means that a non-contracting party cannot bring an action on the 
contract.56 The doctrine enunciates a fundamental principle of law of contract that a stranger to 
a contract cannot sue upon it. In common parlance, the term may mean something secret.57  
This is in keeping with the Webster Third International Dictionary which defines the term 
privity as something that is not made public or displayed.58 Similarly under the Random House 
Dictionary, the word privity signifies private or secret knowledge or participation in the 
knowledge of something private or secret especially as implying concurrence or consent.59  
 
The doctrine of the privity of contract, however, is not only limited to the dictionary meanings 
as they do not give a complete idea about the doctrine. The common man's approach to the 
doctrine and its dictionary meanings, although, helpful in understanding the doctrine to some 
extent, do not assist us in understanding the legal importance of the doctrine as well as to  how 
                                                          
51 Price v Easton (1833) 4 B AD 433.); Tweddle v Atkinson (1861 EWHC J57 (QB); Grant v Stonestreet 1968 (4) 
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(1980) 4 SA 475 (A); Minister of Public works and Land Affairs v Group five Building Ltd (1999) 4 SA 12 (SCA). 
52 Wilmont L et al Contract Law 3rd ed (2009). 261. 
53 Treitel The law of Contract 10th ed (1999), 538. 
54 Furmiston Law of Contract 12th ed (1991) 450. 
55 Hugh Collins The law of contract (1986) 112. 
56 Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract 7th ed (1969) 438. 
57 Peel and Treitel The Law of Contract (2011) 357. 
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it reached the shores of South Africa. The doctrine of privity has not been defined specifically 
and convincingly in South Africa but it has been well established in England and its meaning 
and scope are very clear.60 This is pertinent as the development of the doctrine in England led 
to the development of the doctrine as well in South Africa.61 
 
The doctrine has two distinct elements that can be subtle in appearance.  It prevents third parties 
from obtaining rights or benefits under a contract. This hand of the doctrine refuses to recognise 
a jus quasitum tertio.62  The other aspect also prohibits parties in a contract from imposing 
liabilities or obligations on third parties. This concept which has been identified as the first 
limb was intended to curtail strangers from enforcing contractual provisions. It has also been 
applied in cases where the contract attempts either expressly or impliedly, to confer benefits 
on a third party as was highlighted in the South African case of Mohammed v Southern Sun 
International Hotel.63 Third party beneficiaries are therefore not entitled to take an enforcement 
action if they have been denied the promised benefit and such benefit can range from financial, 
goods, services or other advantages such as the exclusion of liability or an indemnity in favour 
of a third party.64 
A classic example of the dilemma that can be faced by a third party who is promised the benefit 
under the contract might be where under a contract, X promises Y to pay a sum of money to Z 
as a consequence of a transaction. Provided that X fails to pay Z and Y does not pursue X for 
breach of contract, this results in little that Z can do to receive or enjoy the benefit of X’s 
promise. The doctrine in this event will operate as an obstacle to Z in pursuing an action against 
X and Y. This is most apparent in a lot of construction contracts where there can be a contract 
between an employer and the main contractor which may be beneficial to a sub-contractor who 
happens to be the third party in this event. The third party’s rights in this event are subject to 
the doctrine of privity. It is therefore fundamental to determine how the doctrine became a 
force to be reckoned with in the contractual sphere to understand how it is violating the rights 
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61 The inception of the privity doctrine will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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of third parties. This is the basis upon which the need to explore the possibilities of relaxing 
the privity principle emanates from. 
2.3 BACKGROUND TO THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY OF CONTRACT  
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the common law judges reached a decisive conclusion 
upon the scope of a contract.65 It was declared that no one may be entitled to or bound by the 
terms of a contract to which he is not an original party.66 This marked the introduction of the 
privity principle in the domain of the law of contract. As has been highlighted in chapter one, 
the privity doctrine consists of two limbs. The first limb was aimed at preventing a third party 
from enforcing benefits conferred on them by those contracts.67 This suggests that only parties 
to a contract can sue or be sued in terms of that contract and third parties were not entertained 
in the contractual matrix of the two contracting parties. This has been noted to be the 
problematic element of the doctrine of privity as enforcing this limb will result in third parties 
incurring injustices hence the need to find a way to relax the common law doctrine in order to 
accommodate the interests of third parties.68 
In addition to the above, the second limb to the doctrine consisted of the proposition that parties 
to a contract cannot impose liabilities or obligations on third parties.69 The second limb differs 
from the first limb in that the  latter attracts criticism and scrutiny as it fails to address the 
intention of the contracting parties to confer a benefit on a third party.70 This limb has not 
attracted much scrutiny as the conduct of two parties cannot be imposed on a third party. This 
usually happens where a third party is going to be burdened with an obligation. It is only logical 
therefore, not to impose an obligation to a third party. 
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As highlighted in chapter one, the key objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of the 
doctrine of privity in South Africa on third party beneficiaries of commercial contracts paying 
particular attention to construction contracts for the purpose of identifying third parties most 
disadvantaged by the doctrine. It is therefore important to highlight the need to reform the 
privity doctrine. The relaxation of the privity doctrine can be observed from several common 
law countries including England, Ireland and Malaysia which opted to legislatively reform the 
first limb of the doctrine of privity by allowing third parties in certain circumstances to enforce 
a contract made for their benefit. 
2.4 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE 
The historical development of the doctrine of privity shall trace the subtle elements that were 
utilised by the common law courts before the leading case of Tweddle v Atkinson71  and the 
ground breaking case of Berswick v Berswick.72 The formulation of the privity doctrine 
commenced way before the decisive case of Tweddle v Atkinson73 was heard. The privity 
principle was first enforced in the case of Jordan v Jordan74 as shall be discussed below.  
The doctrine of privity of contract owes its origin to the English common law courts. This 
doctrine originated during the period when the judges were busy discovering a suitable 
principle for determining who was entitled to sue for breach of a promise. It, however, took 
considerable time to come to prominence. The doctrine of privity of contract was, for the first 
time, applied in the case of Jordan v Jordan.75 The doctrine was however not applied in the 
way that the privity doctrine has crystallised but definitely left room for development. In this 
case, the lawsuit of a non-contracting party to a promise did not succeed.76 Following this ruling 
to exclude third parties from suing in terms of a promise, in Lever v Keys the court overruled 
the decision in Jordan v Jordan and allowed the stranger's suit on a contract.77 In this case, the 
father of a girl promised the father of a boy that if he would be willing to give his consent to 
the marriage of the boy with the girl and assure 40 pounds to the son, he would pay 200 pounds 
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73 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
74 Jordan v Jordan (1594) Cro Eliz 369. 
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to the son in marriage.78 The action of assumpsit79 was brought by the son upon breach of the 
promise. It was held that the son was entitled to sue thereby defeating the precedence that was 
set in Jordan v Jordan that a stranger could not raise an assumpsit in a contract that he is not a 
part of.80 It can be noted that the development of this common law doctrine was marred with 
confusion at this early stages. The two contrasting provisions were mainly at play and there 
was still a definitive position to be taken.  
 
Taylor v Foster reaffirmed the decision in Jordan v Jordan and applied the doctrine of privity 
of contract and a stranger to the contract was prevented from maintaining his action upon 
breach of the contract.81 In this case, the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would 
marry his daughter, promised to pay 100 pounds in two instalments to one J S to whom the 
plaintiff was indebted.82 The court held that the plaintiff was the proper person to sue and not 
J.S thereby reinforcing the privity doctrine.83 The doctrine had not been established and 
developed but indications of the severity of the doctrine were starting to become apparent at 
this early age. There was therefore a dire need to come up with a clear-cut position as to whether 
the doctrine should be implemented in its rigidity or completely scrapped off. 
 
 In the case of Provender v Wood however, the court overruled the decision of Taylor v Foster 
and allowed a stranger's action on a contract.84 This was indicative of the indecisiveness of the 
common law courts as the doctrine began to take traction. There was a certain level of 
uncertainty surrounding the application of this doctrine as to whether a third party could 
actually sue or be sued by contracting parties. Similarly, in Sprat v Agar the father of a girl 
promised the father of a boy to transfer certain land to the boy in consideration of the boy's 
marriage with his daughter.85 The court in this matter held that the son, although, not a promise, 
                                                          
78 Lever v Keys (1598) Cro Eliz 619. 
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could sue.86 In another leading case on privity of Bourne v Mason the court overruled the 
Provender v Wood87 and Sprat v Agar88 cases and held that the doctrine of privity of contract 
was applicable.89 The plaintiff's action in this case to sue the contract failed as the court held 
that the plaintiff was not the proper person to sue as it said that the plaintiff was a stranger and 
no meritorious cause moved from him.90 The consideration did not move from the plaintiff, he 
could not be held entitled to bring an action for enforcing his claim on breach of contract. The 
privity principle was therefore taking form as it proved to be getting bolder and bolder by each 
passing case that required the employment of the doctrine. The various inconsistent decisions 
where the privity doctrine featured indicated that this was an area that needed special and 
particular attention. The development of the doctrine was therefore associated with a lot of 
indecisiveness as it has not been decided whether to allow a stranger to be involved in the 
affairs of two contractual parties. 
 
The case of Dutton v Poole proved to be an enemy of progress to the strides of the doctrine 
developing as the court of the King's Bench overruled the decision in Bourne v Mason case and 
upheld the stranger's claim, but on a different ground.91 The court did not follow the doctrine 
of privity of contract strictly. The court observed that the stranger was having very close 
relations to the promisee.92 He could, therefore, maintain an action on a contract as a 
beneficiary. In this case the father of the defendant wanted to sell some timber trees.93 The 
defendant promised in consideration that his father would refrain from cutting down the trees 
to pay to his sister Grizil £1000. Grizil, who was Mrs. Dutton with her husband sued for breach 
of the promise.94 It was held that the action was maintainable.95 It appears that the basic ground 
in this case for ignoring the doctrine of privity of contract was the very near and affectionate 
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relation between the plaintiff and her father who was the promisee under the contract.96 The 
court was of the opinion that natural love and affection could constitute consideration, 
therefore, the consideration and promise to the father could extend to the children for there 
existed natural love and affection between them.97 The plaintiff was no doubt, a stranger to the 
contract, but not a stranger to the consideration, she was deemed to have furnished 
consideration, so she was held entitled to sue.98 The court in Dutton v Poole reiterated that the 
principle of privity was of paramount importance and worthy of protecting by the court but 
created an exception where a claim in assumpsit was allowed.  
 
It is submitted that this was the case where an idea emanated that if the stranger, upon whom 
contractual benefit was to be conferred, was closely related by blood to the promisee, a right 
of action would vest in him.99 The development of the privity doctrine also continued with the 
case of Crow v Rogers where a stranger could not base his claim on breach of a promise.100 In 
this case, a person named Hardy owed 70 pounds to Crow and an agreement was made between 
Rogers and Hardy whereby Rogers promised to repay Hardy's debt in consideration that Hardy 
would give a house to him.101 On the basis of this promise Crow sued Rogers but, the court 
rejected his claim on the ground that he was a stranger to the agreement and consideration. 
 
The above view was confirmed in the leading case of Price v. Easton.102 However, in the 
present case, the court preferred to accept only one of the two reasons given for rejecting the 
claim in Crow v Rogers. This reason was that as the plaintiff was a stranger to the contract he 
could not enforce the contract.103 The facts of the case were that one W.P owed 13 pounds to 
Price and he promised to work for Easton who in lieu of it, promised to repay his debt to 
Price.104 W.P. did the work but, Easton failed to repay the debt and Price sued Easton for breach 
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of this promise.105 The suit was rejected and the observation of the court in this case in defence 
of privity of contract is worth quoting: 
"No one may be entitled to or bound by terms of a contract to which he is not an original party."106 
Tweddle v Atkinson is the case in which the doctrine of privity of contract was finally 
established by the Court of Queen's Bench in l86l. In consideration of an intended marriage 
between plaintiff and daughter of one W. Guy, the plaintiff's father entered into a contract with 
W. Guy.107 By this contract, both agreed to pay the plaintiff a definite sum of money which Mr 
Guy failed to do.108 The plaintiff sued his executors but the suit was dismissed by the court. It 
is to be noted that the court in rejecting plaintiff's claim laid more emphasis on doctrine of 
privity of consideration than on the doctrine of privity of contract.109 Nevertheless, the doctrine 
of privity of contract acquired a definite shape in this case. An analysis of the above decisions 
reveals that although the origin of the doctrine of privity of contract may well be traced in some 
earlier decisions, it was the decision in Tweddle v Atkinson which indeed ended the uncertainty 
about the doctrine and gave finality to it. The outcome of this case laid a foundation for the 
doctrine of privity to regulate contractual dealings in which third parties were involved. 
 
It is pertinent to mention that a doctrine which had been toiling hard for its existence in the 
nineteenth century had finally succeeded in getting the final seal of approval by the House of 
Lords in the leading case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co.Ltd. V. Selfridge & Co. Ltd.110 The 
plaintiff in this case sold a number of tyres to Dew and Company with an agreement that Dew 
and Company would not resell them below a fixed price.111 Dew and Company sold the tyres 
to Selfridge who agreed to observe the restriction and promised to pay to Dunlop Company 5 
pounds for each tyre if he violated the restriction clause but Selfridge sold the tyres to another 
at a price which was below the price fixed by restriction clause in the agreement.112 The court 
rejected the claim of the plaintiff and held that a stranger to a contract had no right to sue upon 
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it and ascertained that the plaintiff was a stranger to the contract between Dew & Company 
and Selfridge.113 It can therefore be noted that the claim of the plaintiff was rightly rejected, in 
the absence of such an attitude of the court the commerce would have suffered badly. This 
became the leading case on the validation of the privity rule as a doctrine of the Law of contract. 
2.5 HISTORICAL FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE  
The development of the doctrine of privity can be explained by three individual theories and 
these are the interest theory, the benefit theory and the consideration theory. These theories 
enabled the doctrine to take shape as courts were able to crystallise different elements of the 
doctrine from these theories. The scope of this thesis does not allow for a substantial and 
comprehensive discussion of each of these theories. Besides, this has been done by scholars 
elsewhere.114 The discussion of these theories in this section is limited to the underlying values 
and principles contained in each of these three theories in respect of the privity doctrine. 
2.5.1 INTEREST THEORY 
The interest theory allows a third party to enforce a claim for a benefit promised, for it is in the 
better interest of society as well as that of the third person.115 The interest theory which can be 
traced to the early 17th century diminished in popularity around 1680.116 In terms of the interest 
theory, the reason for permitting third parties to be involved in actions wherein they were not 
primary contractants was because non-performance of the promise caused an injury to the third 
party beneficiary’s interest. If the third party had a clear interest which entitled him to an 
enforcement action and compensation for injury, there should not have been any deterrence on 
him to bring an action.117 This is the position that is being sought by many who feel that the 
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privity principle as it is currently observed in South Africa, is operating to the detriment of 
third parties today.118 
2.5.2 THE BENEFIT THEORY 
Subsequent, to the interest theory was the benefit theory. This theory also made its appearance 
in the early period of the 17th century.119 The judicial trend at this particular time was to 
recognise promises of gifts, marriage contracts and family agreements even though the third 
party beneficiary gave no consideration and had no compensable interest.120 The idea of a 
benefit provided grounds for the third party beneficiary’s action. This was aired out in the Rook 
v Wood case where two brothers had the right to sue for a promise made to their father by the 
defendant.121 The promise was that the defendant would pay the brothers if the father charged 
his land for annuity and this action was allowed on the basis that the promise was made for the 
benefit of the brothers.122 The court stated that the plaintiff did nothing of trouble to himself or 
benefit to the defendant but is a mere stranger to the consideration.123 The benefit theory 
therefore entailed that the action was allowed if there was a benefit made and in the above case, 
the benefit was made to the brothers. 
2.5.3 THE CONSIDERATION THEORY 
Despite the concerted attempts to recognise the interests of third parties in a contract, the 
development of the benefit theory was curtailed by the case of Bourne v Mason where a third 
party beneficiary’s action failed on the ground that he had not provided consideration for the 
bargain.124 The court in this case based their decision on the basis that only those who provide 
consideration have the right to sue and it provided the emergence of the consideration theory. 
The third party had no right to maintain an action and enforce it. As the interest and the benefit 
theory were being replaced by the consideration theory, it resulted in the relief for third party 
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beneficiaries being curtailed at common law.125 There are however a number of inconsistent 
statements about support for the doctrine of privity as will be highlighted in the third chapter. 
The consideration theory was concretised in the famous case of Tweddle v Atkinson around the 
period of 1861 as it was made succinctly clear that consideration had to be effected as a 
condition for the enforcement of a contract.126 This was the period that put an end to the 
uncertainty of the position with regards to the doctrine of privity in the contractual realm. The 
case elucidated that a third party is unable to sue on a contract between two others even though 
it was made for the benefit of the third party. 
 
The consideration position was also followed in the case of Dunlop Pneumatic tyre Co ltd v 
Selfridge and Co where the learned Judge ruled that only parties to a contract can sue and be 
sued on it.127 This decision was substantiated by three basic reasons and the first being that the 
party to a contract can only be one to sue under it.128 The second basis was that the doctrine of 
consideration requires that a person with whom a contract is made is only able to enforce it if 
there is consideration from the promise to the promissor.129 The third being based on agency 
requires that a principal not named in the contract can only be sued if the promisee contracted 
as an agent.130 In Dunlop Pneumatic tyre Co ltd v Selfridge and Co, the Court did not find any 
consideration passing between Dunlop and Selfridge and there was no agency relationship 
between the relevant parties hence Dunlop’s case failed.131 Following this case, the doctrine of 
privity was firmly established as a doctrine in English contract law and was reaffirmed by the 
house of Lord’s in Scruttons Ltd v Midland silicones ltd.132 
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The precedent for the privity doctrine was set in the case of Beswirck v Beswick where a coal 
merchant transferred his business to his nephew who made various promises in return.133 One 
of them was that he would, after his uncle’s death pay a certain amount of money to the uncle’s 
widow.134 The uncle indeed passed away and the widow brought an action to enforce the 
nephew’s promise suing both in her own right and as administratrix.135 The House of Lords 
ruled that the widow could only enforce the nephew’s promise in her capacity as an 
administratix and she was entitled to an order of specific performance. She could therefore 
bring an action as a third party even though the contract was to her benefit. This marked a 
milestone for the doctrine of privity as it was enshrined in the English Law of Contract. The 
effect, therefore, of the privity doctrine is that, a person who is not party to a contract is 
prohibited from suing a party under the contract or enforcing the benefit of the contract.136  
2.6 GENERAL RATIONALE FOR THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE 
It has been argued that the first leg of the privity doctrine is harder to justify.137 Furmiston, 
however argues that denial of a third party right under a contract may be justified on four bases 
as firstly, a contract is a private affair which should only affect the parties to it. The second 
basis is that it would be unjust to allow a person to sue on a contract on which he or she could 
not be sued. The third is that if parties could enforce contracts made for their benefit, the rights 
of contracting parties to rescind or vary such contracts would be unduly hampered.  The last is 
that a third party is often merely a donee and a system of law which does not give a gratuitous 
promissee a right to enforce the promise is not likely to give this right to a gratuitous beneficiary 
who is not even a promisor.138 
Collins also sites that there are three principal justifications for the survival of the privity 
doctrine and the first one is the concept of autonomy.139 The concept of autonomy entails that 
contractual rights and duties remain personal to those who create them and that is the parties 
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in the contract.140 This reason coincides with the one proposed by Treitel who believes privity 
is a two party affair only.141 Smith also contributes to the literature by forwarding that 
contractual obligations are voluntary in nature and they are undertaken by and extending only 
to particular persons who undertook the voluntary obligations.142 Third parties are not included 
in these promises undertook in terms of the voluntary obligations hence should not be able to 
claim or enforce contracts made to others. 
Mutuality of rights is also another reason why proponents for privity of contract vie   for the 
doctrine to remain in full force.143 The third party provides nothing in return for the promised 
benefit and cannot be liable for breach of contracts. It is therefore inequitable to give the third 
party the right to sue upon the contract.144 The third proposed reason for the survival of the 
privity doctrine is the fear of indeterminate range of liability.145 A danger of introducing third 
party rights is the possibility of exposing the promissor to an indeterminate range of liability 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.146 This justification is premised on the 
fundamental principle that the law of contract must limit liability as English law had established 
this line firmly at a point where a person was a party to the contract.147 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
The chapter traced the historical formulation of the privity principle by focusing on the theories 
that were utilised to develop the privity principle. The interest, benefit and the consideration 
were explained and their contribution to the development of this jurisprudential doctrine. The 
chapter also articulated the background to the privity doctrine. The emphasis was placed on 
where the problem with the privity doctrine lies, that being it causes significant injustices to 
third parties. Several general principles of this cornerstone of the law of contract were also 
expounded. The historical development of the privity doctrine was also explored sighting the 
myriad and a plethora of approaches in cases that involved third parties. This was noted to be 
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the developing phase of the privity doctrine as there were some progressive steps as well as 
some frustrations in the crystallisation of the principle as a common law principle in the law of 
contract. Earlier cases that had subtle elements of the doctrine were discussed leading to a point 
where there are various leading and ground breaking cases with regards to the privity doctrine. 
This background helps in understanding how the privity doctrine was conceived in the common 
law of contract. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter dealt with the background and the premises upon which the doctrine of 
privity of a contract is founded upon. The chapter also traced the background to the doctrine 
where the common law judges reached a decisive decision upon the scope of a contract.148 It 
further went on to enunciate the historical development of the doctrine by focusing on the first 
cases where the doctrine was applied. The cases that frustrated the development of the doctrine 
were also highlighted. The principle was also shaped by theories and these amongst other things 
have been explained briefly as this thesis does not allow for an in depth analysis of these 
theories.  The chapter ended on discussing the general rationale of the privity doctrine. Be that 
as it may, this chapter will deal with how the doctrine of privity operates in South Africa 
focusing on the rationale and the criticisms thereof. The chapter will also look at the exceptions 
that have been levelled against this common law doctrine. 
As was discussed above in chapter one, the doctrine of privity of contract is a common law 
doctrine. It has its genesis in the decision of a leading English case of Tweddle v Atkinson. 
Although there is no specific provision under the South African law of contract dealing with 
the doctrine, the doctrine is implicit in various provisions of the law of contract. This chapter 
will focus on the privity doctrine in South Africa showing why the need for reform should be 
entertained. 
3.2 THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
As explained in the previous chapter,  the privity doctrine functions to make sure that only 
contracting parties acquire rights or incur duties in terms of the obligation or obligations created 
by the contract and that third parties are not directly affected as the rights derived from the 
obligation are personal and relative.149 The rule has been negatively applied in South Africa as 
it states that a particular litigant has no contractual cause of action against another litigant when 
the latter is an outsider to the contract.150 Contracts for the benefit of third parties have been 
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accepted by institutional writers151 of South African law and by the courts. There has however 
been a fundamental debate regarding the construction of the contract for the benefit of third 
parties in South Africa as a result of the influence of the English doctrine of consideration.152 
 
The case of Unitrans Freight (Pty) Ltd v Santam Ltd, categorically emphasised that prior to 
acceptance a third party has no right to a contract whatsoever, whether contingent or 
otherwise.153 This reiterates the same position in the English system that a third party should 
not interfere in the contract between two parties regardless of a benefit accruing to the third 
party. The court indicated that, the beneficiary had nothing more than a mere expectation, 
which could, for instance, not survive her death.154 Whether these decisions will be the final 
word on the matter remains to be seen.155 This case highlights a dire need for reform of the 
doctrine and looks for ways to relax rigid application of the rule as it often results in injustices 
for third parties. 
3.3 OPERATION OF THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The doctrine of privity has been a contentious subject by the judiciary and academic 
commentators in relation to the aspect that only parties to a contract can sue or be sued.156 As 
mentioned earlier in chapter 2, a third party is prevented from enforcing benefits conferred on 
them by contracting parties which in turn results in third parties suffering loss and injustice. 
This injustice incurred by third parties has resulted in some common law countries such as 
Britain making legislative summersaults to circumvent the harsh and unintended consequences 
that result from the doctrine. As has been highlighted in the introduction of chapter one, the 
doctrine was established in the famous English case of Tweddle v Atkinson where the fathers 
of the engaged couple contracted with each other to pay some money to the son on the marriage 
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taking place, and it was held that the contract could not be enforced by the son.157 This was the 
genesis upon which the doctrine found its roots and stretched to most countries where the 
common law doctrine was imposed on a subjugated people and this includes jurisdictions like 
South Africa. It is trite that the test to determine whether there was privity of agreement or not 
is a factual one and requires a careful consideration of the factual matrix.158  This is going to 
be the approach to discussing the doctrine of privity in South Africa. 
The privity doctrine has been utilised by South African courts immensely.159 For example, the 
court in Cosira Developments (Pty) Ltd v Sam Lubbe Investments CC dealt with an issue where 
the doctrine was employed.160 The matter before the Court was essentially a claim for specific 
performance, but the main stumbling block in the applicant's cause of action was the absence 
of privity of contract.161 The court remarked that,  
“in the absence of privity of contract between the applicant and the council, the applicant does not have 
the necessary locus standi to bring the present application against the council.”162 
The court heard that the third respondent, a local authority, had invited tenders, in accordance 
with its black empowerment policy, for the purchase and development of three pieces of 
land.163 It had subsequently accepted the tender submitted by the first respondent, Lubbe and 
had sold the land to it in terms of two agreements.164 The agreements required Lubbe to 
commence with the development of the properties within six months from the date of transfer, 
and to complete the development within 18 months.165 Some two months later, without having 
obtained transfer of the properties from the local authority (and without having commenced 
development of the properties), Lubbe sold them to the applicant, Cosira, in terms of two 
further agreements (the August 2005 agreements). After the land had remained registered in 
the name of the local authority for some time, Cosira brought an application against both the 
local authority and Lubbe for an order directing Lubbe to take transfer of the properties from 
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the local authority and directing both Lubbe and the local authority to do all things necessary 
to give effect to the August 2005 agreements and pass transfer of the land into Cosira's name. 
The court held that Cosira could not sue the municipality as there was no privity between the 
two.166 It has to be noted that the court indicated that privity could only be established between 
the Local government and Lubbe and one between Lubbe and Cosira. The court therefore 
disregarded the causal nexus between the parties in order to determine whether indeed there 
were reasonable grounds to establish privity. 
 
The privity rule has also been used by parties to escape contractual liability.167 This has been a 
huge problem that surrounds this common law doctrine as most parties will raise lack of privity 
to escape their contractual obligations.168 Third parties are often left without recourse as the 
exceptions do not extend to their circumstances.169 This came to light in the case of City Of 
Cape Town v Khaya Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others where Counsel for second respondent 
submitted further that it was not possible for the court to deal with the alleged defective work 
by first respondent because there was no privity of contract between them.170 The contract 
was between the first and second respondents, and not with the applicant. This case is 
particularly interesting as it shows the injustice incurred by third parties in contractual matters. 
In this instance, the doctrine was employed to ensure that the third party could not get the relief 
he sought. This becomes a cause for concern as it highlights that the doctrine has been abused 
as it perpetrates injustices for the poor.  
The Constitution recognises that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law 
of general application.171 This right has been violated where the doctrine has been applied. The 
doctrine has been employed by both private persons and juristic persons. What is particularly 
striking is the prevalence of local municipalities employing this doctrine. A good illustration 
would be the case of City of Cape Town v Khaya Projects dealt with development of properties 
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for the benefit of third parties (community of Witsand).172 The local government contracted 
with a contractor to build houses for the benefit of the community.173 The contractor however 
constructed poor structures and the community brought an application against the local 
government to which the government raised the privity of contract as a defence as they had 
entered into a contract with the contractor and not with the community.  
The court noted that the City’s case is that whilst it bears a positive constitutional obligation as 
an organ of state to provide adequate housing, because of the widespread problem of 
contractors building defective low cost housing, an order from a court will provide clarity to 
housing developers that when building for the State, they are also bound by constitutional 
obligations.174 The City wanted all construction companies to incur a constitutional obligation 
not to build defective houses. On that basis it sought a declaration from the Western Cape 
Division of the High Court that Khaya failed to comply with its constitutional obligation to 
construct adequate housing in terms of section 26 of the Constitution, alternatively, a declarator 
that Khaya, in concluding the contract to provide and construct housing as part of the Witsand 
Project, undertook constitutional obligations as set out in s 26(1) of the Constitution. The court 
a quo dismissed the application with costs but granted leave to appeal. The Court’s reasoning 
was that there was a severe lack of privity between all the interested parties in the case. It can 
be noted however that the third party was immensely affected by this decision as the court 
allowed an application to be brought for appeal. It is therefore evident that third parties will 
forever be excluded from contracts that have a bearing on their constitutional rights if the 
doctrine of privity is applied rigidly. 
Be that as it may, courts in South Africa have played a significant role in trying to regulate the 
operation of the doctrine.175 The courts in most cases have noted that the doctrine is mostly 
used by unscrupulous and dubious parties who attempt to escape contractual liability.176 The 
court has been loath to this practise and has cautioned against the misuse of the doctrine. The 
problem however lies in the fact that there has not been a conceptual framework to regulate the 
exercise of this rule. This has resulted in inconsistences in the application of the privity 
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doctrine. The court in the case of Member of Executive Council v Terra Graphics cautioned 
against the defence employed by the local government that there was a dearth of contractual 
privity between the subcontractor and the Local government.177 The case involved a direct 
claim for payment from the Local municipality by a subcontractor who had been sourced by a 
contractor.178 The subcontractor had been promised full payment by the employer and when 
the subcontractor completed the work and demanded payment the employer raised lack of 
privity. In this instance, the court discovered that the local government was behaving 
unconscionably and was abusing the privity doctrine. The local government had made an 
undertaking that they will pay the subcontractor upon completion of the project. The court ruled 
in favour of the sub-contractor by citing that privity had been established.179 The court looked 
and focused more on practicality than it did on the theoretical concept of privity. The court 
having given this matter careful consideration was satisfied that the applicant had proved that 
there was privity between itself and the first respondent and not the second respondent who for 
all intents and purposes was a project manager.180   
3.4 EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVITY RULE 
 The harshness of the doctrine of privity has been acknowledged over time.181  The courts have 
given legal recognition to some of the devices which have been developed to circumvent the 
doctrine of privity.182 The exceptions are going to be explained and they are agency and 
stipulatio alteri. These exceptions will not be discussed in depth as that has been done already 
by other authors.183 There are also exceptions of cession and doctrine of notice which are not 
going to be discussed in this research as the scope of the research will not allow for such. 
3.4.1 AGENCY 
Agency is a situation that has a principal authorising another person, the agent, to represent her 
or him in negotiating a contract.184 A contract entered into by the agent on behalf of the 
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principal will be legally binding on the principal.185 Agency was mentioned as an exception to 
the privity doctrine in Totalisator Agency Board OFS vs Livanos.186 The court held that a third 
party may be able to take the benefit on an exclusion clause by proving that the party imposing 
the clause was acting as his or her agent thereby bringing the party into direct contractual 
relationship with the promisor.  
In South Africa, the use of agency in circumventing the doctrine of privity can be seen in a 
case concerning pre-incorporation contract of Venter NO and Another v Silver Lakes 
Homeowners Association NPC.187 The case involved a section 21 statutory agency pre-
incorporation contract. Section 21 of the Companies Act stipulates that,  
“A person may enter into a written agreement in the name of, or purport to act in the name of, or on 
behalf of, an entity that is contemplated to be incorporated in terms of this Act, but does not yet exist 
at the time.”188 
This demonstrates an avenue that has been legitimised as an exception to the privity rule as an 
individual is allowed to represent a juristic person with a third party who in turn has privity 
with the Company once it gets incorporated. The third party in this case has a direct relationship 
with the company once it is formed regardless of the fact that the contract is entered into 
between the third party and the agent.  
3.4.2 STIPULATIO ALTERI 
Stipulatio alteri is an institution established in South African law where one party to a contract 
may promise another that he will confer some benefit  on a third person who is not  party to the 
contract.189 In McCullough v Fernwood Estate Ltd Innes CJ described a stipulatio alteri in the 
following terms: 
“An agreement for the benefit of a third person is often referred to in the books as a stipulation.  This 
must not be taken, however, in the narrow meaning of the Civil law, for in that sense the stipulatio did 
not exist in Holland.  It is merely a convenient expression to denote that the object of the agreement is to 
secure some advantage for the third person.”190  
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The stipulatio alteri is a convenient instrument for the institution of a third person as 
beneficiary under certain contracts for example, a life policy in South Africa.191 In South 
African law it is possible to contract independently for the benefit of a third party, but it is not 
necessary to do so as an agent. The South African courts have confirmed that it is possible for 
two parties to conclude a valid contract for the benefit of a third person, who is not a party to 
the contract, and who at the stage of contracting need not even exist.192 One party (called the 
stipulans), stipulates the benefit that he or she wishes the other party (called the promittens) 
to confer upon the third person.193 The stipulans extracts a promise from the promittens that 
he will confer that benefit on the third party, or at least offer that benefit to the third party, 
which the latter can accept or reject.194 The English law is different as it does not recognise 
an agreement for the benefit of a third party that is a stipulatio alteri.195   
To constitute a valid stipulatio alteri, it is required that the stipulans and the promittens should 
intend to create an enforceable obligation in favour of the third person, obliging the promittens 
to make a performance to the third person, giving the third person an independent right to 
demand that performance upon acceptance.196 The third party in turn has a right to sue for the 
benefit that has been promised to him regardless of the fact that he/she was not directly involved 
in the contract. The privity doctrine is therefore circumvented by stipulatio alteri nemo poteste.  
It has to be noted that pension agreements, life insurance policies, and inter vivos trust deeds 
are important examples of this phenomenon.197 
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3.6 CRITICISMS OF THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As already referred to in chapter one above, one of the most apparent and vivid disadvantages 
of the privity doctrine  in the South African contractual sphere is the violation of third parties 
rights to have access to the courts. The doctrine violates the constitutional rights of third parties 
to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal.198 The 
Constitution acknowledges the need to develop the common law while promoting the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.199 Common law principles have been in need of reform 
and our courts have been constantly and consistently reiterating this position. The case of 
Barkhuizen v Napier showcases the need to reform the common law rules as Justice Z Yacoob 
remarked that,  
“the question whether the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution require courts to encourage good 
faith in contractual dealings and whether our Constitution insists that good faith requirements are 
enforceable should be determined sooner rather than later.”200  
This also means that the time is now to develop the doctrine of privity of contract as it is a 
colonial legal tradition which does not find a place in the South African modern contractual 
framework.201 
The South African law of Contract therefore has to be viewed through the prism of the 
Constitution. The constitutional dispensation enshrines the notion that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the country and all law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.202 There is 
therefore a duty upon contracting parties to ensure that contractual terms are within the prism 
and confines of section 2 of the Constitution. The Constitution also empowers individuals to 
approach a court or a tribunal by application of law.203 The privity doctrine therefore violates 
this right as it does not confer third parties with a right to approach a court in case of having an 
interest in a particular contract.  
 
                                                          
198 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 34. 
199 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 section 39 (2). 
200 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd (2011) ZACC 30. 
201 A detailed analysis available in Chapter 3. 
202 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, section 2. 
203 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 34. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
35 
It has been made explicitly clear throughout the previous chapters that exclusion of third party 
involvement in the contractual matrix emanated in the English legal system. The denigration 
of this common law principle in the case of Berswick v Beswick by Lord Denning seems to 
have spread to the South African judicial arena.204 Lord Denning was critical of the accuracy 
and necessity of the fundamental principle that no one who is not a party to contract can sue or 
be sued.205 The same notion was also reiterated in the case of Member of Executive Council v 
Terra Graphics206. The court reinforced the idea that there are avenues to avoid its application 
when desired as the principle is not far from ancient.207 The court therefore vilified the 
exclusion of third parties and noted that this was an area that had to be developed as justice so 
required. 
In the case of Berswick v Beswick, Lord Reid expressed discontent and called for a 
reconsideration of the doctrine prohibiting a third party from having an interest in a matter. 
This sentiment was also echoed in the South African Case of City of Cape Town v Khaya 
Projects (Pty) Ltd And Others208 where a local government awarded a tender for the 
construction of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses to a contractor 
who in turn sub contracted to a sub-contractor.209 The sub-contractor did a shoddy job and the 
recipients of the houses sued the municipality. The Municipality in turn raised privity as a 
defence and claimed that the plaintiffs had no locus standi.210  The court indicated that in as 
much as the contract was privy between the municipality and the tender recipient, the RDP 
recipients were entitled to bring a case forward. It was however unfortunate that the court could 
not make a decision on the case as it remarked that it was up to the parliament to make or 
amend the law and not the judge. This is a classic example of the need by the courts to develop 
the common law as envisaged in the Constitution.211 The court however did indicate that there 
was a dire need to relax the common law principle as the exceptions created in our legal system 
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did not extend to the scenario that was unfolding in front of the court. The court did indicate 
that intervention in the operation of the doctrine was desired sooner rather than later. 
The material facts of Gugu v Zongwana also illustrate how the privity doctrine has been 
operating in South Africa.212 On a reading of the sale agreement, it was clear to the court that 
the first respondent had not intended to sell, and the appellants had not intended to buy, the 
first respondent's undivided share in the property.213 The parties had intended to sell and buy 
the actual property itself. It also had to be accepted on the evidence that the second respondent 
had not consented to the sale of the property to the appellants on the terms in the sale 
agreement.  The result was that by virtue of the doctrine of privity of contract, the second 
respondent was not bound by the terms of the sale agreement. A contract being a matter 
between the parties thereto, no one other than the contracting parties can incur any liability or 
derive any benefit from its terms. Accordingly, the second respondent, not being a party to the 
sale agreement, could not be compelled to comply with any of its terms. This is axiomatic and 
encapsulates how the doctrine of privity has been utilised in South Africa. It goes on to show 
that the doctrine has been linked to the element of consensus as lack thereof results in an 
unenforceable contract. The case of Gugu v Zongwana illustrates that the privity doctrine goes 
against the will theory which is used in South Africa to determine consensus.214 The privity 
doctrine negates the essential intention of the parties to benefit the third party. This shows that 
the intention of the parties should be given pre-eminence over the privity principle. 
 It has often been said that the developer, sub-contractor, architect and financier must provide 
undertakings separately to each other as well as to the owner. This informs that any subsequent 
owner or any occupiers of the building for the defective work would need a different contract 
to enforce obligations and corresponding duties. It would be more efficient if the same 
obligations arose from a single provision.215 This echoes the case of Move on Up (Pty) Ltd v 
Martin Kruger Associates CC, where the architect appointed a principal agent in terms of a 
standard building contract contended that because he had not signed the contract, there was no 
contractual privity between him and the employer under the agreement.216 Meer J rejected the 
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contention and claimed that prejudice would be incurred by the third party.217 The privity rule 
has also been noted to be flawed in such circumstances when it comes to contractual contracts 
in South Africa. This has also been a mutual problem in other common law jurisdictions.218 
All of these problems together with the injustice and hardship caused by the doctrine of privity 
must be remedied by reforming the doctrine. South African courts, law commission bodies as 
well as academics alike have subjected the doctrine of privity to extensive criticism. Most of 
this criticism has been directed to the limb of the privity doctrine that only parties to contract 
can claim under it.219 The injustices that the third party rule causes can only be viewed through 
the prism of its massive failure in common law countries like England and Ireland where the 
doctrine has been extensively utilized. It is incumbent upon South African courts and 
legislature to remedy the operation of this doctrine before the principle causes so much 
unsatisfactory and unintended consequences. The need for reform can be attributed to the 
legislative summersaults to circumvent the harsh and unintended consequences that result from 
the doctrine taking way in other common law countries. It is therefore a matter of time before 
some of the apparent issues that forced the reformation of the doctrine in England take pre-
eminence in South Africa. 
3.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has demonstrated that the privity doctrine has been prevalent in South Africa for 
a period more than 120 years.220 In the English law, the doctrine has been a feature for more 
than 150 years.221 There have been various criticisms levelled against the principle. There have 
also been attempts to abrogate the doctrine of privity in some jurisdictions.222 Despite all the 
criticisms and concerns, the doctrine continues to be applied and incorporated in other common 
law countries as well as jurisdictions like South Africa that had the doctrine imposed on them.  
The criticisms of the privity principle when weighed against the rationales for the doctrine 
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indicate that reform and relaxation is desirable. The arguments advanced in defence of the 
doctrine of privity are mostly premised upon the theoretical and doctrinal aspects of the 
doctrine of privity.223 It appears that the concept of autonomy of the contract whereby the 
contract remains personal to the parties to the contract and thus the contract could only be 
affected by them, dominates arguments in favour of privity. It is however of paramount 
importance to note that, theoretical justification alone is not sufficient to preserve the doctrine 
of privity from undergoing reformation. The theoretical formulations in defence of the doctrine 
of privity have failed to produce evidence to the effect that the doctrine has not caused 
difficulties in injustices be it in the commercial life. It can be ascertained that the doctrine of 
privity has caused unimaginable difficulties, hardship and injustice for the third party 
beneficiaries. These hardships which have real effect on the populace are far more important 
in justifying the need to reform the doctrine of privity than the theory that has long supported 
the existence of the doctrine.  
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CHAPTER 4 - REFORMING THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE IN SOUTH AFRICA - 
LESSONS FROM ENGLAND 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed how the privity doctrine operates in the South African 
contractual context in an attempt to highlight the injustices that the doctrine has on third parties. 
The chapter also mentioned some of the recognised exceptions to the doctrine of privity even 
though this was not done holistically because of the limitations of the thesis.224 Further, the 
chapter also brought to surface the criticisms that have been directed at the doctrine in a South 
African contractual context. This following chapter is going to discuss the operation of the 
privity doctrine in England and will assess how the rule was reformed to cater for the interest 
of third parties. 
As explained in chapter one, England has been chosen as a standard of analogy because the 
privity rule developed in the English legal system.225 In addition, the reform of the privity 
principle was also implemented in England in 1999 following the recommendations of the Law 
Reform Commission (LRC).226 This was welcomed as it meant that third parties would no 
longer experience the injustices brought about the privity principle. It has been established that 
the criticisms of the privity doctrine in South Africa outweigh the rationale of retaining the 
doctrine. If not for everything else, the doctrine has some of the most severe injustices for third 
parties and violates fundamental values and rights enshrined in the Constitution of the republic. 
Some of these fundamental rights include the right to approach a court of law in case of a 
dispute.227 The chapter analyses the suitability of the route followed by the English Law of 
Contract to reform the doctrine of privity for compatibility to also be emulated in the South 
African contractual context. 
 
                                                          
224 Word limitations; It would also detract from the core of this research 
225 See also Mahmood A The need for Legislative Reform of the Privity Doctrine in Commercial Contracts in 
Malysia (unpublished LLD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2013) 76. 
226 Law Commission 'Privity of Contract: The Benefits of Third Parties', Item 1 of the Sixth Program of Law 
Reform: The Law of Contract, Presented to Parliament by the Lord High Chancellor by Command of Her Majesty, 
London, July 1996, page  7 
227 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 24. 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
40 
4. 2 DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY IN ENGLAND  
The doctrine of privity in England has survived for over 172 years.228  There were, however, 
problems that arose with the rigid application of the common law principle of privity of contract 
which resulted in third parties to a contract suffering injustices particularly in relation to 
commercial contractual contracts.229 In recent years, the courts have gone a considerable way 
towards developing rules which in many appropriate cases allow the promisee to recover 
damages on behalf of the third parties.230 The law commission proposed the reformation of the 
privity doctrine as it noted the consistent legal battles by third parties for realisation of their 
benefits which proved to be increasing on a yearly basis.231  
 
As discussed in chapter one, the doctrine was implemented and first applied in England before 
it spread to other common law countries. Understanding how the doctrine was reformed in the 
English system will therefore lay a foundation to determine how best the reformation of the 
privity doctrine in South Africa will work.  
 
The enquiry that has to be made is to determine whether reformation in South Africa is possible 
and that can be answered in the affirmative. This can be substantiated by the fact that 
reformation of the doctrine was effected in England where the doctrine was promulgated. In 
order to be able to achieve the desired effect, lessons have to be learnt from the English and 
learn how they were able to reform the doctrine that had caused many injustices to third parties 
in England. 
4.3 THE NEED FOR REFORM IN ENGLAND  
In 1995 the court of Appeal in Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd, 
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Steyn LJ noted the following when criticising the doctrine of privity:  
“The case for recognising a contract for the benefit of a third party is simple and straightforward. 
The autonomy of the will of the parties should be respected. The law of contract should give effect 
to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. Principle certainly requires that a burden 
should not be imposed on a third party without his consent. But there is no doctrinal, logical, or 
policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the benefit of a third party 
where that is the expressed intention of the parties. Moreover, often the parties, and particularly third 
parties, organise their affairs on the faith of the contract. They rely on the contract. It is therefore 
unjust to deny effectiveness to such a contract.”232 
It was on this basis that the LRC was prompted to push for the reformation of the doctrine of 
privity. The commission made recommendations citing why the doctrine needed to be relaxed 
to alleviate the injustices incurred by third parties who have contracts drafted for their benefits. 
The part that sought reformation the most was the part that stipulates that a contract does not 
confer rights on someone who is not a party to the contract.233 The main contention of the 
commission was to allow subsequent purchasers or tenants of buildings to be given rights to 
enforce an architect’s or building contractor’s contractual obligations without the cost, 
complexity and inconvenience of a large number of separate contracts.234 
 
The general rule that a third party cannot acquire rights under a contract to which he is privy 
has been criticised even though it is, in most cases self-evidently desirable that a complete 
stranger to a contract should not have contractual obligations forced upon him.235 This criticism 
on the doctrine has been levelled by academics.236  The doctrine has also been condemned by 
law reform bodies in the United Kingdom and the judiciary in the form of the Law Reform 
Commission and the House of Lords. In the case of Beswick v Beswick, Lord Reid cited with 
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approval that the Law Revision Committee's proposals that when a contract by its express terms 
purports to confer a benefit directly on a third party, it shall be enforceable by the third party 
in his own name.237 While implying that the way forward was by legislation, he stated that the 
House of Lords might find it necessary to deal with the matter if there was a further long period 
of Parliamentary procrastination.238 
 
In the same vein, in Swain v Law Society, Lord Diplock referred to the general non-recognition 
of third party rights as an anachronistic shortcoming that has for many years been regarded as 
a reproach to English private law.239 This articulates that the privity doctrine was causing more 
harm than good on contracts that involved the benefit of third parties. There had been consistent 
calls for the reformation of the doctrine due to its nature of repressing third party interests.240 
The court in Woodar Investment Development Ltd. v. Wimpey Construction Ltd held that the 
law concerning damages for loss suffered by third parties was most unsatisfactory and 
furthermore hoped that, unless it were altered by statute, the House of Lords would reconsider 
it.241 The Court in this instance reminded the House that twelve years had passed since Lord 
Reid had called for a reconsideration of the rule in Beswick v. Beswick242, and hoped for the 
recommendation to be implemented. The court also noted that all the cases which stand guard 
over this unjust rule should be reviewed.243  
 
The call for reformation from the judiciary was so intense that other law bodies got involved.244 
The Law Commission also came on board soon after its creation in 1965.245 The program of 
the Law commission amongst other objectives was to codify the law of contract as well as deal 
with the issue of third party rights. The law commission did some substantial work on the 
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doctrine of consideration as there could have been no fruition in reforming the doctrine of 
privity without first reconsidering the consideration doctrine.246 The cry of third parties as 
espoused by the LRC resulted in an opportunity for the fundamental review of the third party 
rule. 
4.4 CONSTRUCTION OF REFORM  
It is common knowledge that building and engineering projects typically involve a number of 
different contracts between the developer, architects, the head contractor, sub-contractors and 
financiers.247 In observation of the third party rule, those who had not been privy to a particular 
contract were not able to rely on its provisions or to find a contractual action as providing a 
defence. Recourse has been available in foreign jurisdictions in the law of tort.248 This can be 
illustrated with the case of Junior Books Co. Ltd v Veitchi Ltd.249 In the aforementioned case, 
the House of Lords held that a building owner was able to sue a sub-contractor in tort for 
economic loss occasioned by the latter's negligence.250 This was, however not the case aired in 
the case of D & F Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England where it was held that a 
builder was not liable in tort to a subsequent purchaser in respect of the cost of repair of defects 
in the quality of the building.251 This entailed that a builder, in the absence of a contractual duty 
or a special relationship of proximity sufficiently akin to a contract to introduce the element of 
reliance such that the owner owes a duty to prevent economic loss, owes no duty of care in 
respect of the quality of his work.252 This decision was also followed in Murphy v. Brentwood 
D.C. where it was additionally held that the liability of a local authority, which negligently 
failed to ensure that the builder complied with building by-laws and regulations, did not exceed 
that of the builder.253  
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As a result of cases such as Murphy and D & F Estates, third parties, such as property 
financiers, purchasers and tenants frequently seek to protect themselves by means of collateral 
warranties made with the developer, contractor, sub-contractors and professionals such as 
architects, surveyors and structural engineers.254 In the case of an average shopping centre, one 
professional may be expected to enter into separate warranty transactions with the financiers, 
the purchaser and 50 or more tenants.255 Reforming of the privity principle, therefore entailed 
that there would be a reduction to the present complexities by removing the need for so many 
separate documents. If the contract between developer and contractor were expressed to be for 
the benefit of financiers, purchasers and tenants alike, it could remove the need for collateral 
warranties. 
4.5 ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM 
The English law commission in pushing for reformation of the privity doctrine disagreed with 
the view256 that the third party rule does not cause significant problems in practice.257 The need 
for reform would usher in a new era where there was refusal of third parties to enforce a contract 
for their own benefit by the doctrine. The third party rule prevents effect being given to the 
intentions of the contracting parties. If the theoretical justification for the enforcement of 
contracts is seen as the realisation of the promises, the will or the bargain of the contracting 
parties; the failure of the law to afford a remedy to the third party where the contracting parties 
intended that it should have one frustrates their intentions, and undermines the general 
justifying theory of contract.258  There is thus a need to enforce the will of the contracting 
parties if their intentions are to allow a third party to benefit from a contract which can only be 
done by reforming the privity principle. 
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The other argument for reformation of the privity principle focused on the injustice to the third 
party where a valid contract, albeit between two other parties, has engendered the third party’s 
reasonable expectations of having the legal right to enforce the contract, particularly where the 
third party has relied on that contract to regulate his or her affairs.259 It should be noted that in 
most circumstances this argument compliments the argument based on the intentions of the 
contracting parties. In most circumstances, the intentions of the contracting parties and the 
reasonable expectations of the third party are consistent with each other. However, one of the 
most difficult issues that arise is the extent to which the contracting parties can vary or 
discharge the contract.260 That issue can be presented as raising the conflict between these two 
fundamental arguments for reform. 
 
The thesis will now discuss the 3 main criticisms of the privity doctrine which should lead to 
its reformation. These criticisms bring to the fore the reasons why the privity doctrine should 
be reformed in the South African contractual context. 
4.5.1 THE PERSON WHO HAS SUFFERED THE LOSS CANNOT SUE, WHILE 
THE PERSON WHO HAS SUFFERED NO LOSS CAN SUE 
According to the LRC, the privity principle needed to be relaxed in respect of a standard 
situation where the third party rule produces the perverse and unjust result that the person who 
has suffered the loss of the intended benefit cannot sue, while the person who has suffered no 
loss can sue.261 This can be illustrated by the ground breaking case of Beswick v Beswick, as 
the House of Lords held that the widow could not enforce the promise in her personal capacity, 
since the contract was one to which she was not privy.262 The court however went on to 
determine that, as an administratrix of her husband’s estate, she was able to sue as promisee, 
albeit that she could only recover nominal damages.263 Hence we see that the widow in her 
personal capacity, who had suffered the loss of the intended benefit, had no right to sue, while 
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the estate, represented by the widow in her capacity as administratrix, who had suffered no 
loss, had that right.  
 
Furthermore, it was established in Beswick v Beswick that the promisee, as represented by the 
widow as administratrix, clearly wanted to sue to enforce the contract made for her personal 
benefit.264 However, in many other situations in which contracts are made for the benefit of 
third parties, the promisee may not be able to, or wish, to sue even if specific performance or 
substantial damages could be obtained.265 Clearly the stress and strain of litigation and its cost 
will deter many promisees who might fervently want their contract enforced for the benefit of 
third parties.  The other hindrance is often that a contracting party may be ill or outside the 
jurisdiction within which the action has arisen.  If the promisee has died, his or her personal 
representatives may reasonably take the view that it is not in the interests of the estate to seek 
to enforce a contract for the benefit of the third party.266 
4.5.2 COMPLEXITY, ARTIFICIALITY AND UNCERTAINTY 
The existence of the rule, together with the exceptions to it, has given rise to a complex body 
of law and to the use of elaborate and often artificial stratagems and structures in order to give 
third parties enforceable rights.267 Reform would enable the artificiality and some of the 
complexity to be avoided. The technical hurdles which must be overcome if one is to 
circumvent the rule in individual cases also leads to uncertainty, since it will often be possible 
for a defendant to raise arguments that a technical requirement has not been fulfilled.268 Such 
uncertainty is commercially inconvenient. There was therefore a dire need to provide certainty 
in the commercial arena through relaxing the privity doctrine of contract. There has been 
criticism of the third party rule and calls for its reform and relaxation from academics, law 
reform bodies and the judiciary.269 The rule itself has been abrogated throughout much of the 
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common law world, including the United States, New Zealand, and parts of Australia.270 The 
extent of the criticism and reform elsewhere is in itself a strong indication that the privity 
doctrine is flawed. These findings amid other reasons prompted the advances made in the 
English law to reform and relax the privity principle to allow third parties to sue for their 
benefit. 
4.5.3 THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF MOST MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION ALLOW THIRD PARTIES TO ENFORCE CONTRACTS 
To add on the above, another feature that resulted in the reformation of the third party rule in 
English law is the fact that the legal systems of most of the member states of the European 
Union recognise and enforce the rights of third party beneficiaries under contracts.271 In order 
to keep in the prescripts of global trends, it was of dire importance to reform the common law 
doctrine. In France, for example, the general principle that contracts have a binding effect only 
between the parties to them is qualified by Art 1121 of the Code Civil, which permits a 
stipulation for the benefit of a third party as a condition of a stipulation made for oneself or of 
a gift made to another.272 The French courts interpreted this as permitting the creation of an 
enforceable stipulation for a person in whose welfare the stipulator had a moral interest. In so 
doing, they widened the scope of the Article so as to permit virtually any stipulation for a third 
person to be enforced by him or her, where the agreement between the stipulator and the 
promisor was intended to confer a benefit on the third person.273  
 
In Germany, contractual rights for third parties are created by Art 328 of the Burgerliches 
Gesetzbuch permitting stipulations in contracts for performances to third parties with the effect 
that the latter acquires the direct right to demand performance, although the precise scopes of 
these rights depend on the terms of the contracting parties.274 The difference with South Africa 
in relation to stipulation therefore lies in the fact that it has been made a condition that 
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withstands as law in the jurisdictions of Germany and France yet in South Africa it is implicit 
in the common law. 
 
4.6 CONTRACTS RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES ACT 1999  
As a result of the relentless persistence of the Law commission, the common law of contract 
was transformed in the area of privity by the Contract Rights of Third Parties Act, 1999 
hereinafter referred (CRTP). As discussed already in chapter 2 the former general rule was that 
only a party to a contract could enforce its terms, anyone else (a third party) could not.275 The 
Act is applicable to a situation which involves any sorts of rights including the right to rely on 
the limits on liability in a contract where parties may agree, especially in circumstances where 
a subcontractor is to benefit. The Act does not take away any other rights that a third party 
might have independently. 
 
The English law solved the privity conundrum by enacting legislation. The Act makes 
provision for a person who is not a party to a contract (a third party) to the extent that he may, 
in his own right, enforce a term of the contract if the contract expressly provides that he may 
do so.276 This means that if there is a benefit that has been agreed upon by contracting parties, 
the third party now has the right to sue on the basis of one of the contracts to enforce his benefit. 
In English law this means that a subcontractor is now capable of alleviating unnecessary legal 
protocols of suing the contractor in the hope that the contractor will sue the developer. This 
furthermore means that a subcontractor can sue the developer. The legislative summersault has 
been applauded and alleviates the injustices that third parties are prone to. Moreover, the CRTP 
also stipulates that the third party may only enforce a contract if the terms purports to confer a 
benefit on him.277 This therefore precludes a third party from relying on the Act if on a proper 
construction of the contract it appears that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable 
by the third party.278 
 Section 1 of the Act which provides that,  
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276 Contracts rights of third parties Act 1999, section 1 (1) (a). 
277 Contracts rights of third parties Act 1999, section 1 (1) (b). 
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“Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a contract (a “third party”) may in 
his own right enforce a term of the party to enforce a contractual term”279  
overrides the old common law rule that a third party cannot enforce the terms of a contract, as 
established in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd280, and also the rule that a 
third party could not act against the promisor, established in Tweddle v Atkinson.281 It allows a 
third party to enforce terms of a contract in one of two situations: first, if the third party is 
specifically mentioned in the contract as someone authorised to do so and secondly, if the 
contract purports to confer a benefit on him or her.282 Moreover, under section 1 of RTP, the 
Act provides that a third party has a right under it if the contract expressly allows for the third 
party to enforce rights and if the contract purports to benefit them.283 So, this part of the Act 
satisfies the problems which third parties had with the common law and thus cases such as 
Beswick v Beswick284 and Tweddle v Atkinson285 could have gone the other way if they would 
have been heard under this new era. 
4.7 REQUIREMENTS TO RELY ON THE ACT 
The act requires a third party to comply with some requirements in order to rely on the 
legislation specifically implemented for third parties to alleviate injustices being perpetuated 
against them. The Act requires a party to be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a 
member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be in existence when 
the contract is entered into is also another requirement.286 The contracting parties must 
therefore be in a position to explicitly outline who the third beneficiary is as was the case in 
Tweedle v Atkinson where the third party was determinable.287 This has improved the position 
of third parties as it gives effect to the intentions of the parties. 
                                                          
279 Contracts Rights of Third Parties Act 1999, Section 1(1). 
280 Dunlop Pneumatic tyre Co ltd v Selfridge and Co (1915) AC 847 HL. 
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282 Contracts Rights of Third parties Act 1999, Section 3. 
283 Contracts Rights of Third parties Act 1999, Section 3. 
284 Berswick v Berswick (1966) Ch 538. 
285 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) EWHC J57 (QB). 
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The second requirement entails that the Act confers a right on a third party to enforce a term 
of a contract within the bounds of the contract subject to, and in accordance with, any other 
relevant terms of the contract.288 This provision provides context so as to avoid an 
indeterminate range of liability.289 A third party can only enforce a contract which has a direct 
affiliation to him/her. This has a tendency of preventing third parties jumping into every 
contract as they will always find a nexus to various contracts. 
The Act also comes to the assistance of many sub-contractors who find themselves, in most 
cases, suffering a loss as a result of breach of contract. In construction contracts there are 
often interested third parties, such as a purchaser of the building, a tenant or a funder, who 
are not parties to the building contract but may suffer a loss as a result of breach of the 
building contract. Traditionally, such parties have received a collateral warranty in order to 
create a contractual link between them and the building contract, consultant's appointment or 
sub-contract itself and therefore allow the beneficiary to pursue contractual remedies to 
recover losses that it may suffer. The third party's only option otherwise being to pursue a 
claim in tort. The Act provides an alternative to collateral warranties by making it possible 
to incorporate drafting in building contracts, consultant’s appointments and sub-contracts 
which confers rights upon third parties who would have previously only been able to acquire 
such rights by virtue of a collateral warranty. 
4.7.1 CANCELLATION IN TERMS OF THE ACT 
Unless the contract expressly provides a right to cancel or vary without a specified third 
party's prior consent, it will generally not be possible for the contracting parties simply to 
agree to cancel the contract or vary a third party’s right, if the third party had communicated 
his assent to the term in question or has otherwise relied on it.290 The Act therefore recognises 
the interest of the third party and this deserves to be celebrated as it mitigates a lot of court 
cases when the contracting parties do not take the interest of the third party into consideration. 
It also has to be noted that the Act safeguards the third party to prevent the contracting parties 
agreeing to rescind or vary the contract in such a way as to extinguish or alter the rights of a 
third party, unless the third party consents in certain circumstances.291 The same can also be 
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emulated within the South African contractual context to safe guard the interests of third 
parties. 
The Act also, subject to any express terms of the contract, reserves to the promisor, in any 
enforcement of a contract term by a third party, the same defences and/or set-off rights that the 
promisor would have had available to them if the proceedings had been brought by the 
promisee.292 This provision may come as a surprise to third parties who might otherwise have 
thought they had a clear run at a third party claim, without the risk of being met by such 
defences and set-off claims by the promisor.293 At the same time, there is protection of the 
promisor from double liability. If the promisee has already recovered a sum in respect of the 
third party's loss which stems from the relevant contract term, then the third 
party's damages are reduced by an amount that the court or arbitral tribunal think is 
appropriate.294 
The analysis above showcases that it is possible to reform the privity principle in South Africa. 
The answer of the reformation of the privity doctrine lies within promulgation of legislation as 
done in England and some common law countries like Ireland. The legislation has to mirror 
the developments that occurred in England which resulted in the birth of the Contract Rights 
of Third Parties Act 1999. The steps to be taken have been discussed above as well as the most 
important provisions to be encapsulated in the proposed legislation. This should have an effect 
of reducing the exclusion of third party  
Development of the common law in terms of section 39 (2) of the Constitution is also a 
mechanism that has to be explored in order to relax the privity principle. It is therefore possible 
to reform the privity principle in South Africa using either two of the possible mechanisms 
suggested. The development of this common law principle is in tandem with section 172 of the 
Constitution which stipulate that, 
“When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court— (a) must declare that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency…”  
The privity principle has been noted that it violates one’s right in terms of section 34 of the 
Constitution which grants everyone the right to access a court of law. The privity principle is 
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therefore inconsistent with the Constitution as it denies third parties the right to access a court 
solely on the basis that they were not a party to the contract in which they have an 
interest/benefit a benefit in. this instance requires the common law to be developed to cater for 
such injustices as they are violating third parties rights in a post-colonial society founded on 
the values of dignity, equality and freedom for all persons. 
 
While the reforms suggested above, prima facie mirror the English counterpart, the English 
approach is considerably wider and that is the same that is being suggested in this thesis in the 
South African contractual sphere. The English legislation, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act, includes a right of enforcement where the contract purports to confer a benefit on the third 
party.295 The use of the term “purports to confer a benefit” has been used by the English and 
includes third party beneficiaries of an express benefit under the contract and those situations 
where the benefit is ambiguous.296 Where the contract contains an express benefit, the contract 
does purport to benefit the third party, thus manoeuvre for controversy is limited.297 However, 
the interesting point is that the term also covers those third party beneficiaries under a contract 
which contains an ambiguous benefit.298 The result is that all third party beneficiaries in the 
English jurisdiction have a presumption of enforcement where the contract purports to benefit 
them.299 The risk of a third parties being marginalised or the intentions of parties being 
frustrated is thus limited and circumvented. 
 
In addition to the above, there is a presumption of enforcement whenever there is a contract 
that purports to benefit third parties in English law and the same is also advocated for in the 
South African contractual spaces. The proposed reform must just not therefore propose for a 
presumption of enforcement in favour only of those third party beneficiaries who are expressly 
conferred with a benefit under the contract. As a matter of fairness it would be manifestly 
appropriate to uphold an implied third party benefit as well. The presumption of enforcement 
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should therefore be extended in South Africa as well to those beneficiaries that have not been 
expressly mentioned to benefit but those as well who have implied benefits.300. It is reasonable 
to assume that not all contracts shall be clear and unequivocal as to the benefit for third parties. 
Indeed, the need to provide a redress for beneficiaries of an implied benefit must also be 
recognised in South Africa and this is one of the lessons that South Africa can emulate from 
the reformation of the privity doctrine in England. 
4.8 CONCLUSION  
A number of statutory and common law exceptions to the third party rule exist in the South 
African law of contract.301 Some of these exceptions have been discussed in chapter two above, 
where an exception to the third party rule has been either recognised by case-law or created by 
statute. The rule may now not cause difficulty as a result of the exceptions created to 
circumvent the harsh and unintended consequences for example, causing hardships and 
injustices to third parties.302 There is need to highlight however that, this is not the case where 
the situation is a novel one in which devices to overcome the third party rule have not yet been 
tested. The inconvenience of the privity doctrine was identified in the case of Member of 
Executive Council v Terra graphics where a government relied on the principle to escape 
contractual liability to a sub-contractor.303  
 
The mere existence of exceptions to the third party rule in South Africa is a strong justification 
for reform that is elucidated in this case. This is for two reasons: first, the existence of so many 
legislative and common law exceptions to the rule demonstrates its basic injustice304 and 
secondly, the-fact that these exceptions continue to evolve and continue to be the subject of 
extensive litigation demonstrates that the existing exceptions have not resolved all the 
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problems.305 To overcome these problems, it can be suggested that reform of the privity 
doctrine needs to be underway in South Africa. 
 
It is important that reform improves the legal position and rights of third party beneficiaries 
especially in construction contracts while also of benefit to other third parties in other types of 
commercial contracts. The right of third parties to enforce benefits conferred upon them must 
be clearly stated in order to provide certainty.306 If parties to a contract wish to confer a benefit 
on a third party, they should be able to do so thus their intention should be given legal effect. 
This is essentially the reason for legislative transformation in the English law where the goal 
was to give effect to the intention of the parties. Recommendations can be made in terms of 
these developments in the next chapter by way of judicial reform or by way of legislative 
reform. It has been suggested and seen, however, that legislative reform is more desirable in 
comparison to judicial reform.307 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
305 Kotz H ‘The doctrine of privity of contract in the context of contracts protecting the interests of third parties’ 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis commenced with the explanation of the privity of contract doctrine as well as its 
historical origin in the English legal system. The thesis identified that the doctrine has two 
limbs, one which prevents third parties from obtaining rights or benefits under a contract to 
which they are not a party and the other which provides that the parties to a contract cannot 
impose liabilities or obligations on third parties. Unlike the second limb the first has been 
highlighted to be problematic as it attracts continued criticism from the judiciary, law 
commission bodies and academics alike. The critique was focused on the failure of the doctrine 
to respect the intentions of the contracting parties to confer benefits on third parties which in 
produces unsatisfactory results and injustices for third parties. This position which is consistent 
with the preferred position in South Africa as the will theory has been preferred over the 
declaration theory.308 
The key objective of this research was to analyse the negative effects that the doctrine of privity 
in South Africa has on third party beneficiaries of commercial contracts. This is for the purpose 
of identifying the third parties most disadvantaged by the doctrine of privity with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations for reform. The thesis therefore explored the impact of 
the privity doctrine on commercial contractual contracts in South Africa. 
The objectives of this thesis amongst other things were: 
i. To determine the advantages and disadvantages of the privity doctrine if there is rigidity 
in its application. 
ii. Illustrate the operation of the privity doctrine in South Africa and in England. 
iii. Show the importance and benefits of relaxing the privity doctrine in South Africa as 
well as,  
iv.  To explore international best practices in the reformation of the privity doctrine that 
South Africa could emulate. 
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This chapter will therefore sum up the research key findings resulting from the analysis carried 
out. From these findings, this chapter will also offer recommendations to remedy any injustices 
incurred by third party beneficiaries as a repercussion of the privity doctrine. 
5.2 THE KEY ISSUES/RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Chapter two tracked the origins of the privity doctrine as well as established the underlying 
theories and principles of the doctrine thereof. The historical formulation of the doctrine was 
also articulated as well as the rationale of the doctrine of privity whilst also outlining a brief 
history of the development of the rule. The chapter traced the decisive conclusion upon the 
scope of a contract with regards to the position of the doctrine of privity. The court in the case 
of Tweeddle v Atkinson declared that no one may be entitled to or bound by the terms of a 
contract to which he is not an original party to.309 The two components that comprise the 
doctrine were elucidated. The privity doctrine is comprised of two limbs, aimed at preventing 
a third party from enforcing benefits conferred on them by those contracts as well as the second 
one that denotes that parties to a contract cannot impose liabilities or obligations on third 
parties. The criticism levelled against the first limb was highlighted and addressed as the need 
that calls for the relaxation and the reformation of this common law principle. 
The chapter also highlighted the transition from the interest theory to the consideration theory. 
The interest theory allowed third parties to be involved in actions because non-performance of 
the promise caused an injury to the third party beneficiary’s interest. Subsequent, to the interest 
theory was the benefit theory. The judicial trend at this particular time was to recognise 
promises of gifts, marriage contracts and family agreements even though the third party 
beneficiary gave no consideration and had no compensable interest.310 The consideration 
theory replaced the interest and the benefit theory. The consideration theory made it succinctly 
clear that consideration had to be effected as a condition for the enforcement of a contract.311 
This was noted to be the period all the uncertainty surrounding the privity doctrine was cleared. 
The development of the privity doctrine was critically examined. It has to be acknowledged 
that the doctrine of privity of contract owes its origin to the common law courts. The Common 
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law of South African contract is therefore, mostly based on the principles of the English legal 
system. The chapter explained that; a discussion of historical development of the doctrine in 
England will help in better understanding the development of this doctrine. It, however, took 
considerable time to come to prominence. The doctrine of privity of contract was, for the first 
time, applied in the case of Jordan v Jordan.312 The development was followed through the 
advances that were made in all the cases of Lever v Keys313 where there was frustration to the 
development of the privity doctrine as progress was halted.  
 
The re-affirmation of the stance in Jordan v Jordan314 was also entrenched in the case of Taylor 
v Foster315 where a stranger to the contract was prevented from maintaining his action upon 
breach of the contract.316 The court in Provender v Wood317, however overruled the decision 
Taylor v Foster318. The court similarly, in Sprat v Agar319 also overruled the ruling in Taylor v 
Forster where the father of a girl promised the father of a boy to transfer certain land to the 
boy in consideration of the boy's marriage with his daughter where the son even not a promisee 
was allowed to sue.320 The chapter also discussed the frustration brought by the Dutton v 
Poole321 case towards the doctrine as the of the King's Bench overruled the decision in Bourne 
v Mason322 case and upheld the stranger's claim, but on a different ground.323 The position was 
also followed in the subsequent case of Crow v Roger324 where a stranger could not base his 
claim on breach of a promise.325 The view was also shared in Price v Easton.326 The case of 
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Tweddle v Atkinson327 finally ended the uncertainty about the doctrine and gave finality to it. 
The doctrine of privity of contract has been followed ever since the decision of this case. The 
chapter also dealt with the privity doctrine generally. The chapter discussed the general 
rationale of the privity doctrine as an important cornerstone of the common law of contract. 
 
Chapter three deliberated on the privity doctrine in South Africa. It highlighted that the 
rationale of the principle is mainly to make sure that only contracting parties themselves 
acquire rights or incur duties in terms of the obligation or obligations created by the contract 
and that third parties are not directly affected as the rights derived from the obligation are 
personal and relative.328 The rule has been negatively applied as it stipulates that a particular 
litigant has no contractual cause of action against another litigant when the latter is an outsider 
to the contract.329 The case of Unitrans Freight (Pty) Ltd v Santam Ltd, categorically 
emphasised that prior to acceptance a third party has no right whatsoever, whether contingent 
or otherwise.330 This case highlighted a dire need for reform of the doctrine and looks for ways 
to relax rigid application of the rule as it often results in injustices for third parties. The 
highlighted the need with a need to rectify the injustices incurred by third parties. 
 
Chapter three also analysed the operation of the doctrine of privity in South Africa. The fact of 
the matter is that the doctrine has been a contentious subject in various jurisdictions as well as 
in South Africa was highlighted. The basis of the privity doctrine is that a third party is 
prevented from enforcing benefits conferred on them by contracting parties which in turn 
results in third parties suffering loss and injustice. This is the reason why the doctrine has to be 
relaxed as it ought to accommodate that third parties have interests in various contracts that 
they are not entirely a party to or of. 
 
The chapter also traced the use of the privity doctrine usage from cases ranging from Cosira 
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Sam Lubbe Investments CC which dealt with an issue where the 
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doctrine was employed.331 The case of City Of Cape Town V Khaya Projects (Pty) Ltd and 
Others was also discussed at it highlighted how the privity rule is used to escape contractual 
obligations.332 The same plight was also highlighted in the case of Member of Executive 
Council v Terra Graphics where a local was behaving unconscionably in trying to escape 
contractual liability using the privity doctrine.333 This highlighted the dire need to address the 
problems associated with third parties when the doctrine is used to advance a position to their 
detriment. 
 
There are also exceptions that were explored that have been introduced to try and circumvent 
the harshness of the doctrine of privity. The chapter identified the first exception as to be that 
of agency which is a situation that has a principal authorising another person, the agent, to 
represent her or him in negotiating a contract.334 The court in Totalisator Agency Board OFS 
vs Livanos held that a third party may be able to take the benefit on an exclusion clause by 
proving that the party imposing the clause was acting as his or her agent thereby binging he 
party into direct contractual relationship with the promisor.335  
Another form of exception that was acknowledged is stipulatio alteri which was enunciated in 
the McCullough v Fernwood Estate Ltd.336 Stipulatio alteri was described as a concept that 
allows parties to conclude a valid contract for the benefit of a third party. This has an effect of 
circumventing the privity doctrine as it gives the third party an independent right to demand 
performance upon acceptance. These mechanisms have proved inadequate to cater for all 
contractual matrices that the doctrine finds itself operating. It is against this backdrop that the 
doctrine has to be relaxed. The chapter also juxtaposed the rationale of the privity doctrine with 
the criticisms of the doctrine. The doctrine of privity was found wanting as the criticism 
outweighed the rationale of the common law rule. The chapter ended off on a note that indicated 
that reform and relaxation of the doctrine was desirable. 
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Chapter 4 explored best international practices in the reformation of the privity doctrine that 
South Africa could emulate. England was used as the best jurisdiction as the doctrine emanated 
from this common law country. The country also made some summersaults to dilute the rule 
as it was also causing grave injustices in the contractual sphere. The development of the rule 
was also discussed in this chapter as it was pertinent to allow the doctrine in order to understand 
why it was reformed in England and why it needs to be relaxed and reformed in South Africa 
as well. 
 The doctrine was indicated to be married to the concept of consideration which also underwent 
progressive transformation in to ensure the realisation of the reformation of the doctrine in 
England. The same methods are therefore proposed to be followed in South Africa. The call 
for reformation was mainly championed and engineered by the Law Reform Commission. 
Their main agenda was to codify the law of contract in this regard as well as to relax the 
operation of the privity doctrine. 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.5.1 SPECIFIC LEGISLATION  
There has not been any legislation enacted to regulate the operation of the privity doctrine in 
South Africa. Despite the fact that general legislation is unlikely to improve the situation for 
sub-contractors in relation to security of payment for works completed in construction projects, 
it is vital to enact legislation dealing with the operation of the privity doctrine. The contents 
and the operation have been explained in chapter 4.337 There is therefore a need to emulate the 
Contracts Right of Third Parties as has been the development in the English legal system where 
the doctrine has been transformed. This has an effect of circumventing the need to make 
multilateral contracts between the promisor and the promisee and between the promisor and 
the third party. 
In situations however, where there have been promises in the main contracts between the 
employer and the main contractor that the employer would make payment direct to 
subcontractors, such legislation may fall short to provide justice for subcontractors. Jenkins 
and Duckworth have recognised that sub-contractors should consider alternative means rather 
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than seeking to rely on the provisions of the proposed legislation.338 This is because the 
legislative solution needs to refer specifically to requirements for employers to honour 
promises to pay sub-contractors. There is therefore a need for specific legislation addressing 
the issue of direct payment to sub-contractors. The specific legislation must embody the effect 
of reforming the privity rule to the extent that sub-contractors are allowed to enforce at the 
promises made by employers in the principal contracts to pay the sub-contractors directly. This 
mechanism of direct payment has to be allowed despite not being parties to the contract. The 
inclusion of this provision in the proposed legislation will become specific legislation targeting 
the problem of direct payment by employers and accordingly abrogating the doctrine of privity 
in relation to third party benefits in the construction industry. 
This thesis therefore resolves the issue of direct payment and demonstrated injustice to 
subcontractors as a result of the doctrine of privity as discussed in chapter 3. This addition is 
lacking in the legislation regulation the doctrine of privity in England in the CRTP 1999 Act 
as that has been opted for enactment as well in the South African contractual sphere. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated criteria which would effectively contribute to the legislative 
reform of the doctrine of privity in South Africa thereby providing for and enhancing the rights 
of third parties especially in contractual contracts as well as insurance contracts. The proposed 
reform is in line with South Africa’s preferred will theory as it empowers law bodies to dispense 
the operation of the doctrine of privity and to give effect to the intention of the contracting 
parties to benefit third parties. By allowing third parties to enforce their rights to obtain the 
benefits conferred on them under the contract, the spirit and letter of the will theory are fulfilled. 
In conclusion, the following recommendations are made: 
i. South Africa should reform the doctrine of privity to recognise the right of third party 
beneficiaries to enforce benefits conferred by the parties to a contract. 
ii. The existing types of third party beneficiaries who are already equipped with the right 
to enforce benefits should be expanded to include all types of third party beneficiaries. 
iii. The general legislation similar to England’s 1999 Act should be enacted in South Africa 
with some amendments to ensure the efficacy of the proposed reform. This general 
                                                          
338 Jenkins J and Duckworth J, ‘Privity of contract the impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999’,207. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
62 
legislation will offer rights to various categories of third party beneficiaries to sue for 
the benefits promised by the contracting parties. This has also an effect of eliminating 
uncertainty and unpredictability as to the rights of third parties as the proposed 
legislation specifically identifies who is entitled to enforce the benefits in the contract. 
This has an effect of eliminating the need for Courts to apply common law exceptions 
which can be timely and costly thereby enhancing efficacy and efficiency. 
There is a duty that has been bestowed on our Courts by the legislature to develop the 
common law. Section 39(2) of the Constitution stipulates that when interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every Court, tribunal 
or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects the Bill of rights.339 There is an outcry 
for reformation and relaxation of this doctrine in South Africa as it has worked so many 
injustices for third parties.  
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